The Limits of the Right to Sell and the Rise of Federal Corporate Law by Park, James J.
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 70 | Number 1 
Symposium: Confronting New Market Realities: Implications for Stockholder Rights to Vote, Sell, 
and Sue 
2017 
The Limits of the Right to Sell and the Rise of Federal Corporate 
Law 
James J. Park 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James J. Park, The Limits of the Right to Sell and the Rise of Federal Corporate Law, 70 Oᴋʟᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 159 
(2017). 
This Panel 2: Right to Sell is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University 
of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
 
159 
THE LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO SELL AND THE RISE 
OF FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 
JAMES J. PARK* 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 159 
II. The Right to Sell and Corporate Law ................................................... 162 
III. Two Limits of the Right to Sell .......................................................... 167 
A. Corporate Failures ........................................................................... 168 
1. Mismanagement and Precipitous Shareholder Losses ................. 168 
2. Federal Intervention ..................................................................... 170 
B. Materiality and Corporate Governance ............................................ 176 
1. The Difficulty of Valuing Governance ........................................ 176 
2. The Example of Executive Compensation ................................... 179 
IV. Assessing the Rise of Federal Corporate Law .................................... 181 
A. A Test for Evaluating Federal Corporate Law................................. 181 
B. Efforts to Protect Investors from Corporate Failures ....................... 182 
C. Efforts to Regulate Corporate Governance ...................................... 184 
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 186 
I. Introduction 
For skeptics of mandatory corporate law, the right to sell is the most 
important of the three investor rights.1 The legal rights to vote and sue are 
of limited effectiveness in the modern corporation, where the directors 
control the proxy statement and are generally shielded from suit by the 
business judgment rule. The self-help strategy of selling is a simple but 
powerful way for the unhappy shareholder to protect himself when he 
believes that the governance of a corporation is corrupt. 
Indeed, the right to sell is arguably the defining characteristic of a public 
corporation. Public shareholders can easily exit their investment by selling 
their shares while private shareholders cannot. Public companies are thus 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Jaclyn Newell for excellent 
research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., Strougo v. Hollander, 111 A.3d 590, 595 n.21 (Del. Ch. 2015) (identifying 
the “default powers of shareholders as three: the right to vote, the right to sell, and the right 
to sue” (quoting WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 177 (2d ed. 2007)).  
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subject to a different sort of regulation than private companies.2 Because 
public shareholders can easily sell their shares, the market will check poor 
corporate governance. As unhappy investors exit, the price of the 
company’s stock will drop, making it easier for a new owner to purchase 
control of the company. Henry Manne, who first recognized the 
significance of this market for corporate control, thus declared that there 
were “Two Corporation Systems,” with the economic incentives of 
investors playing an equal role as the law in regulating the public 
corporation.3  
Scholars who view corporate law through a law and economics lens thus 
argue for less government regulation rather than more. In the context of 
corporate governance debates, the right to sell has long supported the 
argument that the ongoing judgment of a market of self-interested investors 
is a better judge of good and bad governance than regulators and judges.4 
Under this view, public companies are mainly public in the sense that they 
are subject to monitoring by public markets. They are not public in the 
sense that the government should shape them in a way that furthers the 
public good. In the United States, public companies have thus been 
regulated by a relatively limited set of federal securities laws, with the bulk 
of corporate governance rules left to the states.  
Over the last decade and a half, this framework has come under pressure. 
The argument that public companies should be left relatively free from 
corporate governance regulation has been challenged by the increasing 
federalization of corporate law in the United States. Public companies, 
especially large ones, are increasingly differentiated from private 
companies through the regulatory requirements of federal law.5 The federal 
securities laws have been amended through statutes such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”)6 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. 
L. REV. 259, 259 (1967) [hereinafter Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems]. 
 3. See generally id.  
 4. The right to sell corresponds with the concept of Exit described by Albert 
Hirschman as one of three ways a member can influence an organization. See ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: REPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND STATES 4 (1970). Hirschman observes that “exit” corresponds to “market” rather than 
“non-market forces,” which correspond to the option of “voice.” Id. at 19. 
 5. For an analysis of this trend, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, 
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 
(2013).  
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).  
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),7 which contain 
mandates relating to corporate governance. Now, public companies are 
being shaped by law rather than economics. 
The heightened federal interest in corporate governance can be linked to 
the limits of the right to sell.8 This Article focuses on describing two of 
these limits. First, when there are serious corporate governance problems 
that result in a precipitous decline in the company’s fortunes, shareholders 
do not have time to exercise the right to sell. Investors thus are unable to 
meaningfully pressure management for change and are unable to protect 
themselves from substantial losses. The second limit relates to corporate 
governance practices that may be suboptimal, but do not significantly 
impact the economic value of the firm. Because shareholders will not sell 
with respect to “immaterial” governance concerns, the right to sell is unable 
to pressure managers to change. 
The Article then shows how federal regulation of corporate governance 
can be understood as addressing these two limits. The internal control 
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley seek to prevent substantial destruction of 
shareholder value caused by misappropriation or fraud by managers. 
Executive compensation reforms—such as those found in Dodd-Frank—
were partly necessitated by the view that the market was unable or 
unwilling to pressure the board to change compensation policy. In 
particular, the Say-on-Pay reform is an attempt to increase shareholder 
voice on executive compensation. 
These interventions have blurred the distinction between corporate and 
securities law. More and more, federal securities laws are imposing 
mandatory requirements on public corporations. These regulations are 
corporate law in that they are meant to protect shareholders from 
destruction of value while they own a stock, rather than securities law that 
protects investors when they purchase securities. As the limits of the right 
to sell have become more apparent, federal corporate law is addressing 
those limits. 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 8. Another prominent explanation has been the general tendency of Congress to pass 
governance measures in response to a stock market collapse. See, e.g., Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1779, 1782-83 (2011) (discussing passage of Dodd-Frank); Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 
1528 (2005) (discussing passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).  
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The Article concludes by evaluating these federal interventions under a 
framework developed in a previous article.9 The danger of federal corporate 
law is that it can impose mandatory rules that only benefit a subset of 
shareholders. The question Congress should ask when making federal 
corporate law is whether such efforts would clearly benefit almost all 
shareholders. Applying this framework shows that there is a better case for 
federal intervention to ensure the integrity of large public company 
valuations than there is for federal executive compensation reform. 
Shareholders have a strong interest in preventing precipitous destruction of 
shareholder value, but shareholders may not agree on the need for particular 
corporate governance provisions. 
Part II of the Article briefly traces the intellectual history of the right to 
sell in the context of corporate law. Part III then describes two major 
limitations on the right to sell and how aspects of recent federal legislation 
are best understood as responses to these limitations. Part IV assesses these 
federal reforms. Part V concludes the Article. 
II. The Right to Sell and Corporate Law 
This Part II traces the origins of the right to sell in the corporate law 
literature. Two prominent law and economics scholars, Henry Manne and 
Ralph Winter, discussed the right to sell in challenging two influential 
arguments. The first was that agency costs within the corporation make it 
likely that managers will exploit shareholders, necessitating protection 
through corporate law. The second was that federal intervention is 
necessary to remedy the laxity of state corporate law.  
Writing in 1959, Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes was one of the 
first legal scholars to note the role of the right to sell in protecting 
shareholders.10 Commenting on efforts to promote shareholder democracy 
to check corporate power, Chayes argued that increasing shareholder voice 
would be ineffective in regulating the power of significant public 
corporations.11 Unlike other stakeholders, shareholders are free to sell their 
shares, and thus are able to protect themselves from poor corporate decision 
making. Because of this ability to disassociate from the corporation, 
                                                                                                                 
 9. James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 
64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 137-43 (2017). 
 10. Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE 
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 40 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959). 
 11. Id. at 40 (“It is unreal, however, to rely on the shareholder constituency to keep 
corporate power responsible by the exercise of the franchise.”).  
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shareholders are no more entitled to a voice than groups such as workers 
that cannot exit the corporation.12 
Citing aspects of Chayes’s work a few years later, Henry Manne 
challenged the famous Berle and Means theory.13 Under their agency costs 
framework, corporate law is necessary to address the “separation of 
ownership and control” that leaves managers unchecked in furthering their 
interests at the expense of shareholders.14 In discussing the issue of 
corporate democracy, Manne noted that the right to sell provided an 
alternative remedy for poor corporate governance. As more and more 
unhappy shareholders sell their shares, the company’s stock price will 
decline, making it easier for an outside investor to purchase enough shares 
to gain control of the company.15 
This, of course, was Manne’s famous market for corporate control 
argument, which he later elaborated on in a 1965 article, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control.16 In that article, Manne described the role of 
markets in policing the effectiveness of managers.17 While state corporate 
law does not actively judge management performance, the market for 
control provides “some assurance of competitive efficiency among 
corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the interests of 
vast numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders.”18 The market, rather 
than the law, thus provides shareholders with protection from 
mismanagement. 
                                                                                                                 
 12. For a more recent argument that the right to sell undermines the shareholder 
democracy analogy, see Usha Rodriguez, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and 
Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1398 (2006) (referring to “the power of 
easy exit through the sale of their shares – that is, the power to leave their polity”).  
 13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932). 
 14. Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. 
L. REV. 399, 418 (1962) [hereinafter Manne, The Modern Corporation].  
 15. Id. at 410-11. Adolf Berle responded to the right to sell argument, noting that 
corporations do not always need to seek financing, thus the right to sell may not 
meaningfully check managers. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the 
Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1962). However, Berle did not directly address 
Manne’s market for corporate control argument. 
 16. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110 (1965) [hereinafter Manne, Mergers and the Market]. 
 17. Id. at 113. 
 18. Id. 
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It is perhaps no accident that Manne’s work coincided with the 
development of the efficient markets hypothesis by financial economists.19 
If stock prices reflect available information about the corporation and its 
value, they should also reflect information about the governance of the 
corporation. Manne’s work thus linked an emerging body of research to 
debates among corporate law scholars about the nature and scope of public 
company regulation.  
Another important Manne article, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law 
and Economics, further developed the implications of the right to sell for 
corporate governance.20 The article began by noting that corporate law 
scholarship should distinguish between public corporations, which are 
subject to market forces, and closely held corporations, which are not. An 
advantage of the public corporation is “the investor’s freedom to dissociate 
himself from a particular corporation if for any reason he becomes 
dissatisfied with its management.”21 “[T]he market allows discrete 
decisions to be made by individual investors” to sell their shares rather than 
requiring a collective decision to dissolve the corporation.22 According to 
Manne, the right to sell is a more effective way of regulating management 
than the legal method of the derivative suit, “which can be used only to 
police the more blatant forms of wrongdoing.”23 The operation of “market 
forces” should “constrain managers in a far more significant fashion than 
does the derivative suit.”24 
Building on Manne’s insights nearly a decade later, Ralph Winter 
defended state regulation of corporate law against persistent arguments for 
federal incorporation.25 Prominent commentators such as William Cary, a 
former SEC Chairman and Columbia Law School professor, had criticized 
state corporate law, particularly the law of Delaware, as failing to 
adequately protect shareholders from managers.26 For Cary, federalism in 
corporate law leads to a “race for the bottom,” where states will cut back on 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Eugene Fama’s article The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices was published in 1965, 
the same year as Manne’s Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control. See Eugene F. 
Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965). 
 20. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems, supra note 2. 
 21. Id. at 264. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 273. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
 26. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663 (1974). 
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shareholder protections to influence managers to choose their jurisdiction 
when forming a corporation. Winter noted that these criticisms implied that 
the stock prices of Delaware corporations would be lower than corporations 
formed in other states because Delaware shareholders would sell their 
shares if they were not protected from corporate mismanagement relative to 
other states.27 It would not be “in the interest of Delaware corporate 
management or the Delaware treasury for corporations chartered there to be 
at a disadvantage in raising debt or equity capital relative to corporations 
chartered in other states.”28 Citing Manne, Winter also noted that a 
corporation whose shareholders are selling their shares would be vulnerable 
to a hostile takeover that would replace its management.29 Because of the 
shareholder’s right to sell, the “chartering decision . . . so far as the capital 
market is concerned, will favor those states which offer the optimal yield to 
both shareholders and management.”30  
The next generation of corporate law scholars empirically tested 
Winter’s hypothesis that Delaware had an incentive to create law that 
would dissuade shareholders from valuing the company less because of 
poor corporate governance. An event study by Roberta Romano showed 
that corporations moving to Delaware did not suffer a statistically 
significant negative stock price reaction.31 In discussing Delaware’s 
incentive to maximize shareholder wealth, Romano discussed the right to 
sell, explaining:  
Stockholders are expected to sell their shares if their firm is in a 
jurisdiction with inferior (non-value-maximizing) laws, in order 
to invest in the more valuable firms located in states with more 
favorable legislation. These transactions will cause the stock 
price of the business incorporated under the inefficient legal 
regime to decline. . . . As a result, the corporation may be the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Winter, supra note 25, at 256. 
 28. Id. at 257. 
 29. Id. at 266. 
 30. Id. at 275. 
 31. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 226-73 (1985). A later study by Robert Daines found evidence that 
the average Tobin’s Q, a measure of the market value of a firm, was higher for companies 
incorporated in Delaware. See generally Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm 
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001). This Delaware effect, however, has not persisted. See 
Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004). 
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target of a takeover attempt, for new owners will be able to 
increase firm value by changing the corporate domicile.32 
The right to sell is also relevant to modern corporate governance debates  
about increasing shareholder power. For some time, shareholder rights were 
seen as unimportant to large investors, who were apathetic about exercising 
such rights because they could simply sell their shares.33 Opponents of 
increasing shareholder rights have cited the ability of shareholders to exit in 
resisting significant changes to the balance of power between shareholders 
and the board. As Stephen Bainbridge wrote in response to a proposal by 
Lucian Bebchuk to increase shareholder power,34 when “governance terms 
are unfavorable, investors will discount the price they are willing to pay for 
that firm’s securities. As a result, the firm’s cost of capital rises, leaving it, 
inter alia, more vulnerable to bankruptcy or hostile takeover.”35 According 
to Bainbridge, shareholder power is thus unnecessary to protect most 
shareholders and could result in disruptive activism that undermines the 
power of the board to exercise centralized authority over the corporation on 
behalf of all shareholders.36 Bebchuk’s reply to Bainbridge noted that the 
idea of a vibrant market for corporate control is no longer realistic given the 
potency of takeover defenses such as the poison pill.37 
Recently, John Morley and Quinn Curtis invoked the right to sell in 
another context, the governance of mutual funds.38 Investors in an open-
ended mutual fund are permitted to exchange their shares immediately for 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Romano, supra note 31, at 229-30.  
 33. See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Beating the Wall Street Rule with a Stick and a Carrot, 
7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 251, 251 (1988) (“The Wall Street Rule, which has been immutable 
for as long as any of us can remember, dictates that shareholders not take an active role in 
corporate affairs.”).  
 34. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).  
 35. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; see also 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 83, 122 (2004) (noting market constraints on management).  
 36. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 35, at 1744-51.  
 37. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1784, 1790 (2006) (“The market for corporate control thus leaves management with 
considerable slack.”). 
 38. John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and 
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010). Morley also invokes 
the right to sell in explaining why investors give managers significant control over 
investment funds. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of 
Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014). 
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cash. Their withdrawal represents a proportionate share of the value of the 
assets held by the mutual fund. In contrast, investors who own stock 
directly will find that their investment reflects the future prospects of the 
firm, including the value destruction that may be caused by poor 
governance. Although a shareholder must sell at a price discounted by the 
possibility of mismanagement, the mutual fund shareholder can sell at a 
price that does not reflect the future impact of poor fund governance. 
Morley and Curtis are thus skeptical about the need for mutual fund 
governance measures such as voting, boards, and excessive fee litigation. 
They argue that the right of mutual fund investors to sell may mean that 
such governance may be unnecessary and should be replaced by other 
forms of regulation. 
More than fifty years after Manne’s initial work on the subject, the right 
to sell continues to be influential with respect to the assessment of corporate 
governance rules. Scholars who view markets as the primary regulator of 
corporate governance “focus on exit as a kind of first among equals” with 
respect to the various options (Exit, Voice, and Loyalty) that Albert 
Hirschman described for influencing an organization.39 The argument that 
shareholders can protect themselves from managerial misconduct by exiting 
offers a powerful reason for limiting corporate governance regulation. 
III. Two Limits of the Right to Sell 
Over the years, the right to sell has had varying degrees of success as an 
argument to resist federal regulation of the public corporation. The world 
has changed since the time of Manne and Winter. Corporations have grown 
larger and more complex. Technology has created ventures that can be 
extremely profitable for investors but are difficult to value. The creation of 
wealth has provided more opportunities for managers to divert gains for 
themselves. As a result, investors must place more and more trust in the 
integrity of management and the systems they have put in place to monitor 
risk.  
In part because of the complexity of this new world, the severity of 
corporate governance scandals has increased, highlighting the limits of the 
right to sell in protecting shareholders. This Part III argues that two of these 
limitations explain increasing federal intervention with respect to the public 
corporation. First, the right to sell can be ineffective when bad corporate 
governance results in a rapid and substantial decline in corporate value. 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 
73 CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1673 (1985).  
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Shareholders may not have time to pressure management to change or sell 
to protect themselves in such circumstances. Second, some corporate 
governance issues may be difficult to directly link to the economic 
performance of the firm. Even if shareholders prefer a particular 
governance measure, if it does not have a direct impact on the stock price, 
shareholders will not have an economic incentive to sell their shares. The 
recent efforts to federalize corporate law might be understood as addressing 
these two limitations to the right to sell.40 
A. Corporate Failures 
1. Mismanagement and Precipitous Shareholder Losses 
The right to sell’s effectiveness depends in part on whether shareholders 
have time to exercise the right. One obvious drawback of the right to sell is 
that selling shareholders will necessarily take a loss. As Manne 
acknowledged, “sales by dissatisfied shareholders are necessary to trigger 
the mechanism and . . . these shareholders may suffer considerable 
losses.”41 According to Manne, the right to sell operates after these initial 
losses in preventing “even greater capital losses,”42 presumably by either 
pressuring management to change or by selling to a new control group that 
will implement new management and policies. 
The right to sell should work best in situations where a particular 
governance policy has a clear but modest impact on the company’s 
performance. Over time, shareholders who are unhappy with the stock price 
will gradually exit from the company. Such shareholders can take a 
manageable loss and move on to another investment. This basic pattern 
does not apply to the modern corporate crisis where public companies of 
substantial size have quickly collapsed, arguably because of poor corporate 
governance, leaving shareholders with little time to exercise the right to 
sell. 
To be fair, the proponents of the right to sell do not view it as a panacea 
in preventing serious losses. Manne noted that in certain circumstances, 
                                                                                                                 
 40. There are, of course, other limitations, such as the ability of managers to entrench 
themselves so they do not have to respond to the market for corporate control.  
 41. Manne, Mergers and the Market, supra note 16, at 113; see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1443 
(1989) (noting that shareholders in company with an unfavorable change in governance “can 
sell, but they can’t avoid the loss”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (1989) (“The seller of shares bears the 
consequences of agency costs through a lower sale price.”). 
 42. Manne, Mergers and the Market, supra note 16, at 113.  
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selling by shareholders may “imply that the corporation will not survive.”43 
Manne also acknowledged that “corporation law must still provide some 
device for recovering damages from dishonest, disloyal or grossly negligent 
managers,” though he criticized the derivative suit as ineffective relative to 
the right to sell.44 Nevertheless, Manne may not have anticipated the events 
that in more recent years have resulted in questions concerning the 
effectiveness of the right to sell. 
Corporate governance scholars have long observed that shareholders are 
best able to protect themselves from poor management when it is 
observable prior to their investment in the firm. Lucian Bebchuk, for 
example, in discussing the issue of whether corporate law should be 
mandatory or enabling, distinguishes between governance provisions that 
are set forth in the initial corporate charter and those that are adopted 
midstream by managers.45 While shareholders can price the likely effect of 
poor governance before they enter an investment, they are vulnerable when 
there is an unexpected governance change after they have invested. 
A distinction might also be drawn between situations where midstream 
conduct causes modest harm and where midstream conduct causes 
significant harm. In cases of modest harm, shareholders can react by selling 
their shares, putting pressure on the company to make a change. In cases of 
significant harm, the damage may be so substantial that the company is 
unable to recover. Even if shareholders sell their shares, the damage has 
already been done and may not be reversible.  
The distinction between modest and significant declines in value depends 
on the assumption that the market is not completely efficient in assessing 
the fundamental value of the company. If the market were that efficient, 
shareholders would be compensated for the risk of a precipitous decline. 
The initial price they paid for the stock would have been appropriately 
discounted to take into account the possibility of a complete loss.  
There is reason to believe, though, that it is difficult to adequately 
compensate investors for taking on the risk of a sudden collapse. Consider a 
case where there is a 50% chance that a firm is worth $90, and a 50% 
chance the firm is worth $10. One view might be that the correct stock price 
should be $50. An investor who pays that amount is arguably compensated 
for the risk of loss. On the other hand, because of the wide variance in 
possible outcomes, there is an argument that $50 would not be a meaningful 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Manne, The Modern Corporation, supra note 14, at 410.  
 44. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems, supra note 2, at 272.  
 45. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989). 
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price. As finance professor and valuation expert Aswath Damodaran 
observes:  
In general . . . best-case/worst-case analyses are not very 
informative. After all, there should be no surprise in knowing 
that an asset will be worth a lot in the best case and not very 
much in the worst case. Thus, an equity research analyst who 
uses this approach to value a stock priced at $50 may arrive at 
values of $80 for the best case and $10 for the worst case; with a 
range that large, it will be difficult to make a judgment on 
whether the stock is a good investment.46 
When risk is uncertain, there is a danger of substantial mispricing.  
Consider a scenario where the market believes there is a 0% chance of a 
complete collapse for a $100 stock, but the true risk is 10%. Under that 
scenario, the stock should be priced at $90. The shareholder who purchases 
the stock for $100 would overpay by  $10.  
Even if a market is efficient, the risk of loss may not stay constant. The 
initial price the shareholder paid for the stock becomes less relevant when a 
shareholder holds the stock for a significant length of time. A shareholder 
may purchase at a time when there was no risk that a stock would go to $1, 
but several years later, the risk of such a loss suddenly increases to 80%. 
One might argue that the price the shareholder paid reflected the risk that 
years later the risk of loss would increase, but it is unlikely that the market 
will always be able to meaningfully assess the probability of events years in 
the future.  
The right to sell thus assumes that investors are able to adequately assess 
the risk of a catastrophic governance failure. Because it can be difficult to 
evaluate such risk, the right to sell will not always protect investors from 
midstream conduct that results in significant value destruction. 
2. Federal Intervention 
Though there have always been questionable public companies that 
collapse in the wake of poor decisions, there are now more examples of 
companies that were thought to be stable companies of significant value but 
have quickly failed, arguably because of systematic corporate governance 
failure. These cases illustrate the limits of the right to sell and were the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR 
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 895 (3d ed. 2012). 
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main impetus for the passage of federal corporate law that seeks to protect 
shareholders of significant public companies from substantial loss.  
Three of the most startling examples of failed public companies are 
Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers. Enron was an energy company 
with the seventh-highest market capitalization in the United States and a 
triple-A credit rating. It issued a substantial earnings restatement in October 
2001, issued a multi-year restatement in November 2001, and then filed for 
bankruptcy less than a month later.47 WorldCom was a telecommunications 
company. In June 2002, it reported that it had understated its expenses by 
$3.852 billion and restated its earnings.48 It filed for bankruptcy less than a 
month later. Lehman Brothers was an investment bank with a market 
capitalization of over $30 billion in January 2008.49 Less than eight months 
later, it filed for bankruptcy protection after its market capitalization 
declined by nearly 95%. 
External events likely played a major role in the decline of these 
companies. Both the Enron and WorldCom crises occurred in the wake of 
the collapse of the first internet bubble.50 Investors became less willing to 
invest in companies with speculative businesses. The market for 
telecommunications services declined, making it difficult for WorldCom to 
maintain its earnings. Lehman Brothers collapsed in the wake of the 
financial crisis of 2008, as investors began questioning the value of 
mortgage-related assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions. 
All three of these failures were also arguably caused by poor corporate 
governance. Enron failed to manage transactions with special purpose 
entities that resulted in significant conflicts of interest.51 WorldCom failed 
to prevent significant accounting fraud.52 Lehman Brothers failed to 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 287, 288 
(2003). 
 48. DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. 2 (Mar. 31, 
2003). 
 49. Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 2, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 
526 B.R. 481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Nos. 08–13555 (SCC), 08–01420 (SCC)). 
 50. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND 
ITS UNDOING (2004). 
 51. For a report on some of these transactions, see First Interim Report of Neal Batson, 
Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 
2003).  
 52. For a concise description of the fraud, see First Amended Complaint, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. WorldCom, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
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manage the risk of its balance sheet.53 Executives at both Enron and 
WorldCom were convicted of criminal securities fraud.54 The board 
members of WorldCom were required to personally contribute to 
settlements of civil actions arising from the fraud.55  
The failure of these companies and the resulting shareholder losses 
illustrate the limits of the right to sell. Investors suffered billions of dollars 
in permanent losses from investments in what were established public 
companies. Many investors had no meaningful opportunity to sell, and even 
if they had, the pressure caused by their sales was too late to effectuate 
meaningful governance change. These events lead some investors to 
question their approach to corporate governance problems. As a 2010 
policy paper by TIAA-CREFF analyzing the “Crises of the Last Decade” 
noted, investors can no longer rely on their right to sell for protection but 
instead “should be vigilant in trying to prevent problems before value is lost 
and it is too late to sell . . . .”56  
The governmental response to these monumental governance failures 
was significant federal intervention. Rather than leave the protection of 
shareholders to the states, Congress passed two major Acts that have helped 
shape the governance of large public companies. The first, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,57 addressed the problem of unexpected company failures by 
strengthening internal control requirements and requiring board audit 
committees to be independent.58 As described by a congressional report, 
Sarbanes-Oxley was prompted by “recent corporate failures” and included 
measures to “improve investor protection in connection with the operation 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Valukas, supra note 49.  
 54. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron Chiefs Guilty of Fraud and Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/business/25cnd-enron.html; Ken Belson, 
Ex-Chief of WorldCom Is Found Guilty in $11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/16/business/exchief-of-worldcom-is-found-guilty-in-11-bill 
ion-fraud.html.  
 55. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, 10 Ex-Directors from WorldCom to Pay Millions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/06/business/10-exdirectors-
from-worldcom-to-pay-millions.html.  
 56. TIAA-CREFF INST., POLICY BRIEF: RESPONSIBLE INVESTING AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: LESSONS LEARNED FOR SHAREHOLDERS FROM THE CRISES OF THE LAST 
DECADE 1-3 (Mar. 2010), https://www.tiaadirect.com/public/pdf/institute/pdf/pb_responsi 
bleinvesting0310a.pdf.  
 57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.). 
 58. Id. § 404. Sarbanes-Oxley contains a number of other corporate governance 
provisions such a ban on personal loans to corporate executives, id. § 402, and provisions 
relating to the independence of auditors, id. §§ 201-209. 
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of public companies.”59 The second, the Dodd-Frank Act,60 addressed the 
problem of systemic risk that resulted in the sudden failure of financial 
institutions. Congress explained that Dodd-Frank was meant to form “a new 
framework to prevent a recurrence or mitigate the impact of financial crises 
that could cripple financial markets and damage the economy.”61 
Sarbanes-Oxley was meant to help ensure the integrity of a company’s 
financial statements. In doing so, Sarbanes-Oxley not only protects 
investors who are purchasing the company’s stock, but also the 
shareholders who continue to hold the stock. A House Report noted this 
concern when acknowledging the losses incurred by Enron shareholders 
who were unable to sell their shares while the company collapsed.62 By 
helping reduce material deficiencies in a company’s financial statements, 
internal controls provide shareholders with protection from surprise losses 
that can quickly destroy value. By requiring independent audit committees 
for listed public companies, Sarbanes-Oxley sought to create a structure 
where the board can better supervise the audit process. In effect, Sarbanes-
Oxley rejects the view that the right to sell will largely protect shareholders 
from significant losses.  
While Sarbanes-Oxley addressed the governance problem of accounting 
fraud, Dodd-Frank responded to a somewhat different problem: the failure 
of financial institutions to manage risk. For example, under the Volcker 
Rule, certain financial institutions are limited in their proprietary trading 
and investments in private equity and hedge funds.63 This regulation is 
based on the premise that some types of trading risk are too difficult for 
shareholders to effectively monitor. The Dodd-Frank Act thus attempts to 
protect shareholders by reducing such risk. 
Both Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank are controversial for the costs 
they impose on public companies. Whether or not these Acts are efficient 
ways to protect shareholders is a topic that is best left for another day. 
Indeed, an argument could be made that the failure of the right to sell 
should not lead to the conclusion that private ordering should be 
abandoned. Another right, the right of shareholders to diversify, would be 
                                                                                                                 
 59. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 23 (2002). 
 60. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 61. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010).  
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 18 (2002). 
 63. Dodd-Frank Act § 619.  
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sufficient to protect investors from substantial losses.64 For this Article, the 
important point is that both Acts can be linked to the perception that 
investors need protection beyond the right to sell. 
It is telling that in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, 
Delaware, the leading state corporate law maker, made efforts to protect 
investors from systemic corporate governance failure. In the 2006 case 
Stone v. Ritter,65 the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board has a duty 
to monitor the corporation for wrongdoing.66 This duty to monitor was 
narrowly defined. The board can only be liable if it “consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”67 This narrow duty, 
however, still permitted the Delaware Chancery Court to find that two AIG 
board directors failed to adequately monitor the company for financial 
wrongdoing.68 Such efforts might have been motivated by the concern that 
the inability of Delaware to prevent massive corporate governance failures 
could result in increasing federal intervention with respect to corporate 
governance.69 
Other states also reacted to protect investors from sudden value 
destruction. The California Supreme Court created a right of action for 
holders of stock to sue for securities fraud in Small v. Fritz Companies.70 
Because federal law only permits purchasers and sellers of stock to bring 
suit,71 such state causes of action provide additional protection to 
shareholders who are unable to sell to avoid significant losses. The 
California Supreme Court was prompted to create such a cause of action 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities 
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 641 (1985). 
 65. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 66. Id. at 370. This duty was introduced in an earlier decision by Chancellor Allen. See 
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). The duty to monitor 
was rooted in the board’s duty of good faith, which for a time was seen as a standalone duty. 
See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004). 
However, Stone v. Ritter clarified that good faith was derivative of the duty of loyalty and 
not an independent duty. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 67. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 68. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 2009). In other cases, 
however, the Delaware Chancery did not find a breach of the duty. See, e.g., In re Citigroup 
Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 69. One might question whether these efforts were lasting changes or merely efforts to 
deflect criticism in the wake of Enron. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business 
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005).  
 70. 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003). 
 71. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975). 
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because of the wave of fraud that resulted in the collapse of Enron and 
WorldCom. It explained: 
The last few years have seen repeated reports of false financial 
statements and accounting fraud, demonstrating that many 
charges of corporate fraud were neither speculative nor attempts 
to extort settlement money, but were based on actual 
misconduct. “To open the newspaper today is to receive a daily 
dose of scandal, from Adelphia to Enron and beyond. Sadly, 
each of us knows that these newly publicized instances of 
accounting-related securities fraud are no longer out of the 
ordinary, save perhaps in scale alone.” The victims of the 
reported frauds, moreover, are often persons who were induced 
to hold corporate stock by rosy but false financial reports, while 
others who knew the true state of affairs exercised stock options 
and sold at inflated prices.72 
For a time, there was a surge of class actions filed in state court asserting 
fraud brought pursuant to this holder theory. Though the U.S. Supreme 
Court later found that such holder cases were preempted by federal law if 
brought as a class action,73 the creation of the right reflects the concern of 
protecting shareholders from misconduct. 
Despite the efforts of Delaware and other states to create duties 
protecting shareholders from sudden value destruction, it is likely that 
federal law will be more influential in regulating public corporations. 
Federal internal controls and corporate governance requirements apply to 
most of the largest public corporations. Any financial institution will need 
to comply with the extensive mandates of Dodd-Frank. In contrast, 
Delaware sets a minimal floor that only requires the existence of a 
monitoring system. 
Thus, there is a connection between one of the limits of the right to sell, 
that it does not protect against substantial failures of corporate governance, 
and the rise of federal corporate law. The most prominent federal 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Small, 65 P.3d at 1263-64 (quoting STEVEN G. SCHULMAN ET AL., COMM. ON 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: THE IMPACT ON 
CIVIL LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS FROM THE PLAINTIFFS' PERSPECTIVE 
1 (2002)). 
 73. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 84-85 (2006). 
For an argument that such holder claims should not be preempted, see Amanda M. Rose, 
Life After SLUSA: What Is the Fate of Holding Claims?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 455 (2002). 
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interventions directly address the problem that shareholders cannot always 
react quickly enough to stop corporate wrongdoing. 
B. Materiality and Corporate Governance 
The right to sell is also limited in that it is only triggered with respect to 
corporate governance provisions and practices that are obviously material 
to the firm’s economic performance.74 There may be governance that the 
shareholders are unhappy with, but if it has a minor impact on the firm’s 
value, shareholders may not be willing to sell what could be a profitable 
investment.  
1. The Difficulty of Valuing Governance 
The value of good corporate governance is difficult to measure. An 
electronics company with strong checks on management may nevertheless 
perform poorly because consumer tastes change and demand for the 
company’s product declines. In contrast, an energy company with little 
protection for shareholders may perform well because the market price of 
oil is strong. Even if there is an argument that the energy company could 
perform better with strong governance, it will be difficult for shareholders 
to prove that such measures would have such a result, and little pressure for 
management to adopt such measures if they choose not to.  
Corporate governance matters most in particular circumstances that not 
all companies will face. For example, if managers want to make a decision 
that is likely to result in the destruction of value, an effective board could 
challenge the managers so that they do not make the wrong choice. But how 
often will a company find itself in that particular situation? It might be rare 
for such decisions to arise, making the value of a good board difficult to 
assess. 
Another reason investors may not see governance as material is that as a 
company grows larger, it is difficult for any one particular governance issue 
to affect more than a small percentage of the company’s market value. 
Shareholders might disagree with individual polices, but it may be unclear 
whether each individual policy will have more than a nominal impact on the 
company’s value. As Lucian Bebchuk and Ehud Kamar show, companies 
may bundle questionable governance measures with actions shareholders 
agree with, making it difficult for shareholders to oppose the entire 
                                                                                                                 
 74. For purposes of assessing legal liability, a “fact is material if there is a substantial 
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bundle.75 A shareholder is unlikely to sell for the sole reason that he 
disagrees with one particular governance practice.76  
Furthermore, the right to sell may not be particularly effective with 
respect to issues where shareholders’ preferences substantially vary. Some 
shareholders may care about ethical issues, such as whether the company 
sells diamonds from questionable sources,77 while other shareholders who 
are focused on the economic performance of the firm will not. Even if a 
shareholder sells, it is unlikely that such sales will affect the market price 
for the shares. The right to sell thus would not be effective in pushing 
through change that does not fit the interests of the traditional profit-
maximizing shareholder. 
Thus, the literature has yet to conclusively establish a link between 
particular corporate governance provisions and shareholder wealth. A study 
by Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black failed to find evidence that companies 
with more independent directors on their boards perform better than 
companies with fewer independent directors.78 This finding cuts against the 
intuition that such boards are more likely to discipline poor managers. On 
the other hand, there is evidence that a staggered board, which makes it 
more difficult for a company to change control, is negatively associated 
with a firm’s market value.79 On balance, it is fair to say that “the empirical 
literature investigating the effect of individual corporate governance 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1549 (2010) (studying proposals for staggered boards bundled with a merger). 
 76. For example, institutional investors may have an investment strategy that makes it 
difficult for them to exit. See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant 
Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140 (noting that exit is not feasible for 
investors using a passive investment strategy); Robert Profusek, The Increasing Power of 
Institutional Investors, WALL ST. J.: THE EXPERTS (June 24, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://blogs. 
wsj.com/experts/2015/06/24/the-increasing-power-of-institutional-investors/ (noting that 
because of the increasing size of investments, “major institutional investors have become the 
equity markets and cannot just vote with their feet when a company in which they are 
invested underperforms or misallocates capital—that is to say, the ‘Wall Street Rule’ is 
dead”). 
 77. Congress through the passage of Dodd-Frank required the SEC to pass rules relating 
to the disclosure of the use of conflict minerals. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act § 1502, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-18 (2010). 
 78. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002).  
 79. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. 
ECON. 409 (2005); but see K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value 
of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016).  
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mechanisms on corporate performance has not been able to identify 
systematically positive effects and is, at best, inconclusive.”80  
Studies have, however, found that groups of corporate governance 
provisions appear to be correlated with firm performance. Paul Gompers, 
Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick constructed an index based on twenty-four 
governance rules, and found that firms with the strongest shareholder rights 
earned abnormal returns of 8.5% per year relative to the firms with the 
weakest shareholder rights.81 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen 
Ferrell constructed a narrower index with six governance provisions 
relevant to the entrenchment of a board, and found that firms with higher 
entrenchment had lower valuations.82  
Though they are suggestive, these studies do not establish a strong case 
that particular governance provisions are material to investors.83 If good 
governance is associated with groups of factors, it is unlikely that investors 
will put pressure on management by selling their shares if one or two 
desirable governance provisions are not present. Moreover, these studies 
are by their nature retrospective—looking at the past performance of firms 
over many years. They do not establish that present-day investors will react 
to the presence or absence of these factors, though perhaps these results 
may encourage investors to examine governance indices going forward in 
deciding whether to sell.84 Although there have been efforts to construct 
indices that can guide investment decisions, it is unclear whether investors 
are actually using these indices to decide whether to exit an investment. 
There is an intuition that good governance is better for corporations, but 
it is far from certain whether it affects investor decisions. Absent clear 
breakdowns in corporate culture, investors are unlikely to put pressure on 
managers by actively selling their shares. Thus, while the right to sell might 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1814 (2008).  
 81. See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).  
 82. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 783 (2009).  
 83. There have been some studies that have questioned the link between these 
governance indices and firm performance. See Bhagat et al., supra note 80, at 1827-32. 
Moreover, evidence of a correlation does not establish causation. See Yair Listokin, 
Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 90 (2008). 
 84. Indeed, there is now a significant industry that produces governance indices for 
investors. See Bhagat et al., supra note 80, at 1807.  
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provide a check against what is clearly bad governance, it is unlikely that 
the right to sell is always effective in encouraging firms to reform. 
2. The Example of Executive Compensation 
When the right to sell does not induce companies to adopt particular 
governance provisions, reformers have pushed for federal intervention to 
mandate corporate governance standards. This dynamic is illustrated by 
federal efforts to regulate executive compensation in public companies.  
One of the most controversial issues of corporate governance relates to 
the compensation paid to high-level corporate managers.85 One allegation is 
that executives manipulate boards so that they are paid richly, even when 
their performance does not warrant high compensation.86 Because 
executives often influence who sits on the board of directors, and many 
board members themselves are executives at other companies, there seems 
to be a corrupt system where insiders benefit themselves at the expense of 
shareholders. Though the rise in executive compensation is arguably linked 
to the growth in the size of public companies,87 there is an argument that 
there are abuses in the way executive compensation is awarded. 
The right to sell does not put meaningful pressure on companies to 
change executive compensation policies. While payments can be substantial 
to an individual, they are usually an immaterial fraction of the company’s 
value.88 Absent a clear link to company performance, even shareholders 
                                                                                                                 
 85. The issue has attracted the attention of the popular press. See, e.g., David Owen, The 
Pay Problem: What’s to Be Done About C.E.O. Compensation, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12, 
2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/12/the-pay-problem. For a brief 
history of the issue, see Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the 
Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 846, 857-64 (2011). 
 86. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004); Charles 
M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation – A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 
947-48 (1993).  
 87. See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So 
Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON. 49 (2008) (presenting evidence of correlation between increase in 
CEO pay and growth in market capitalizations of public companies). 
 88. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Twenty Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom: An 
Essay on the Limits of Civil Liability of Corporate Directors and the Role of Shareholder 
Inspection Rights, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 290 (2006) (noting that “the area of executive 
compensation is one in which the materiality threshold is rarely reached”); Bevis Longstreth, 
A Real World Critique of Pay Without Performance, 30 J. CORP. L. 767, 771 (2005) (noting 
that the issue of executive compensation “lacks materiality and, therefore, deserves far less 
attention than it gets”); see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 86, at 55-57 (discussing why 
markets do not check excessive executive compensation). 
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who object to the size of such compensation may still not sell their shares. 
Thus, there will be little pressure on boards from selling shareholders to 
reform their practices. The persistence of high executive compensation is an 
indication that the market is unable to resolve the issue. 
As the problem of executive compensation remained unsolved, reformers 
turned to federal legislation.89 While executive compensation has long been 
subject to disclosure under the federal securities laws, recent disclosure 
rules are more aggressive in attempting to pressure companies to reduce 
executive pay. For example, Dodd-Frank requires disclosure of the ratio 
between the CEO’s compensation and the typical worker of the company,90 
as well as the relationship between executive compensation and the 
company’s performance.91 Moreover, following the example of 
independent audit committees set forth by Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank 
requires all members of the compensation committees of a listed public 
company to be independent.92 By separating the committee that approves 
compensation from management, the hope is that the board will negotiate 
more aggressively with management. Rather than allow shareholders to 
protect themselves, federal standards attempt to create boards that act to 
protect shareholders from executive compensation abuses. 
Because shareholder exit has not been an effective way of regulating 
executive compensation, Congress has attempted to reinvigorate 
shareholder voice on the issue.93 The Say-on-Pay Reforms thus require 
public companies to periodically have a shareholder vote on the company’s 
executive compensation practices.94 The results of such votes are 
nonbinding, but a negative vote could serve as an impetus for changing a 
                                                                                                                 
 89. State efforts to regulate executive compensation through corporate law have been 
minimal. Though the Disney derivative litigation, In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 
907 A.2d 693 (2005), brought attention to the issue, the case set a high bar for finding a 
board liable for approving an excessive compensation package.  
 90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953(b), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903-04 (2010); see also Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 
50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249). 
 91. Dodd-Frank Act § 953(a). 
 92. Dodd-Frank Act § 952(a).  
 93. Moreover, shareholders have their own incentive to exercise voice when they are 
unable to exercise the right to sell. Sophia Grene, SRI: Ethics Beyond the Wall Street Walk, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/a032abf0-86b0-11e4-9c2d-
00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e3 (“Company boards are starting to accept that they have to engage 
with shareholders, particularly asset managers. With the rise of passive managers, who do 
not have the option of selling shares with which they are unhappy, engagement is likely to 
grow.”). 
 94. Dodd-Frank Act § 951.  
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company’s compensation policy. According to the legislative history, the 
hope is that such “votes on pay would serve as a direct referendum on the 
decisions of the compensation committee and would offer a more targeted 
way to signal shareowner discontent than withholding votes from 
committee members.”95 Put another way, requiring such votes arguably 
allows shareholders to express displeasure with executive compensation 
payments without more drastic measures such as selling their shares. A fact 
that may not be material to the investor’s decision to sell may be material 
with respect to the investor’s decision to vote. It is telling that Congress has 
tried to remedy the failure of the right to exit to solve the problem by 
mandating a right to voice. 
IV. Assessing the Rise of Federal Corporate Law 
Part III argued as a descriptive matter that aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
and Dodd-Frank reforms can be understood as addressing limits of the right 
to sell. This Part IV takes up the normative question of whether this federal 
response is warranted. It concludes that there is a stronger case for federal 
intervention with respect to protecting shareholders from precipitous 
declines in value than for intervening to correct governance issues that are 
not economically material to shareholders. 
A. A Test for Evaluating Federal Corporate Law 
The increasing federal intervention with respect to the governance of 
public corporations has blurred the distinction between corporate and 
securities law. These reforms have been implemented through amendments 
to the federal securities laws, increasing the regulation of what was once the 
domain of the states.96 Though many of these provisions have elements of 
securities law in that they relate to disclosure, there is a sense that they do 
more than create securities law. 
In a prior article,97 I argued that corporate and securities law can be 
distinguished based on the type of protection they provide to investors. 
Securities law protects investors while they are trading; corporate law 
protects investors while they are owners of shares. As a trader, an investor 
is vulnerable to buying or selling at a distorted price. As an owner, an 
                                                                                                                 
 95. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 134 (2010). 
 96. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (observing 
that the states “traditionally” have regulated a “wide variety of corporate conduct” and that 
“extension of the federal securities laws” may “interfere with state corporate law”).  
 97. Park, supra note 9.  
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investor is vulnerable to corporate misconduct that destroys the value of his 
shares.  
Judged by this standard, significant aspects of both Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank are effectively federal corporate law. These efforts were 
prompted by failures of significant public companies, where the regulatory 
regime, both state and federal, seemed ineffective in preventing massive  
harm to shareholders. Internal controls are partly motivated by the desire to 
protect shareholders from precipitous destruction of value. Executive 
compensation reform is motivated by the argument that shareholders need 
protection from executives who manipulate the compensation process to 
capture value for themselves. Though they are formally part of the 
securities laws, these interventions are better thought of as a type of 
corporate law. 
In my prior project, I argued that because corporate and securities law 
protect different types of interests, there is an argument that they should 
differ in their regulatory approaches.98 Because all trading investors have a 
strong interest in valuation, securities law is both uniform and mandatory. 
In contrast, it is more difficult to identify uniform interests for shareholder-
owners. Some shareholders have a short-term horizon and prefer to defer 
less to managers, while other shareholders have a long-term horizon and are 
more willing to defer to managers. There is thus a stronger case that 
corporate law should be diverse and enabling.  
Though there is good reason to distinguish between federal securities law 
and state corporate law, there will be situations where it may be appropriate 
to create federal law to protect ownership interests. Regulators should be 
most wary of the possibility that a federal intervention will unduly favor 
one set of shareholders over others. Thus, when making federal corporate 
law, there are two considerations to keep in mind.99 The first is whether 
there is a compelling case that the policy would benefit shareholders. The 
second is whether the policy might favor some groups of shareholders over 
others. 
B. Efforts to Protect Investors from Corporate Failures 
Viewed in light of this framework, there is a case that efforts to protect 
investors from sudden corporate failure are warranted. For one thing, there 
is an argument that such reforms, which include Sarbanes-Oxley’s internal 
controls, are a hybrid of securities and corporate law. Internal controls and 
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independent audit committees benefit not only shareholder-owners, but also 
purchasing investors who rely on the integrity of company financial 
statements in trusting market valuations. They are thus consistent with the 
traditional role of federal securities law in protecting the integrity of 
markets. To the extent that internal controls are primarily directed at large 
public companies, there is a national interest in the soundness of such 
companies. 
There is a case that some level of internal control regulation offers 
benefits for shareholders. While internal controls are costly, such costs are 
modest for large public companies. To the extent that they improve the 
reliability of financial statements, internal controls will provide assurance to 
shareholders that there is a lower risk of wrongdoing by management that 
will reduce the value of their shares. Internal controls offer additional 
protection to shareholders who are unable to identify significant problems 
before it is too late to sell without incurring a substantial loss. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, to identify precisely what level of internal controls is 
appropriate, but there is an argument that efforts to improve the accuracy of 
financial reporting can help remedy the inability of shareholders to protect 
themselves through the right to sell.  
A significant objection to internal control regulation is that shareholders 
will likely disagree about the appropriate extent of internal controls. Some 
investors may be satisfied with a minimal level of protection, while others 
may want more. Mandating a uniform rule with respect to internal controls 
may favor those investors who are risk-averse over investors who are more 
willing to take on risk. 
One solution to this objection could be to limit internal control 
requirements to larger companies that tend to be attractive investments for 
investors who are relatively risk-averse. Indeed, the regulatory consensus 
has been that the most stringent rules should be reserved for larger, 
established public companies that are able to afford the cost.100 Smaller 
companies are exempt until they grow to a size where there is a greater 
expectation that financial controls will be effective.101 To the extent that 
investors want to take on substantial risk, they can do so by investing in 
smaller companies.  
                                                                                                                 
 100. Moreover, some of the costs of internal controls for larger public companies are 
offset by benefits that are exclusive to larger companies, such as easier access to the capital 
markets. See James J. Park, Two Trends in the Regulation of the Public Corporation, 7 OHIO 
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429 (2012).  
 101. See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 103, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 15 
U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).  
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Another way of addressing the concerns associated with a mandatory 
rule is to allow companies some flexibility in how they may comply with it. 
For example, the regulations governing the reliability of internal controls 
appear to be principles-based rather than rules-based. The ambiguity of 
these provisions allows companies to balance different shareholder 
interests. Initially, there was significant concern about the meaning of the 
internal control requirements, perhaps making public companies 
overcautious in their compliance, but over time, companies have become 
more comfortable with the regime. There have not been aggressive 
enforcement actions directed at ex ante compliance with the internal control 
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that would prompt public companies to apply 
the mandate in a uniform way. Different companies have room to comply in 
different ways, allowing for some regulatory diversity. 
C. Efforts to Regulate Corporate Governance 
In contrast, the case for federal intervention to address the second limit 
on the right to sell is weaker. The fact that certain governance policies are 
immaterial to investors indicates that investors themselves do not believe 
that reform would benefit them. The fact that investors are not selling could 
indicate substantial disagreement about which governance rules are 
optimal. 
On the other hand, it may be that shareholders need some protection 
from policies that are difficult to trace to value destruction. It is telling that 
some of the more extensive executive compensation measures were passed 
in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. One justification for Dodd-
Frank’s regulation of executive compensation was the belief that problems 
in the design of such compensation contributed to excessive risk-taking that 
destroyed shareholder value.102 There is a strong argument, though, that the 
problematic compensation policies of the financial firms that failed during 
the crisis were specific to the investment banking industry.  
There will likely be substantial shareholder disagreement with respect to 
corporate governance reform. Although virtually all shareholders would 
agree that value destruction is a bad thing, it is unlikely that all or even 
most shareholders will believe that addressing immaterial corporate 
governance issues is a priority. The danger of some proposals to increase 
mandatory governance regulation is that they will advance the interests of 
some shareholders over others. Congress and the SEC should exercise 
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caution in promulgating federal governance standards because of the 
difficulty of linking such standards to the one unifying concern of 
shareholders, the value of their shares. 
As governance interventions increase, the danger is that they will 
snowball, affecting areas that are more and more tangential to the common 
interests of shareholders. The precedent of executive compensation 
regulation, while only somewhat controversial, could lead to other 
regulatory reforms that are more questionable. For example, after the 
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission,103 there have been efforts to require public companies to 
disclose political spending pursuant to the securities laws. There are 
indications that some investors are interested in knowing more about the 
political spending of corporations,104 but it is far from clear that there is a 
consensus by shareholders on the issue. It is likely that political spending is 
fairly minimal in amount, and would be immaterial to shareholders.105 The 
issue has resulted in an unfortunate politicization of the issue, where 
Senators rather than shareholders appear to be pushing for reforms that 
have unclear economic benefits for shareholders.106 
Rather than mandatory federal intervention, a preferable approach might 
be to provide avenues for shareholders to express their preferences with 
respect to particular governance policies. Put another way, thoughtful ways 
of allowing shareholders to exercise voice can be an appropriate response 
when the right to sell is ineffective. The Say-on-Pay law might be an 
example of such intervention. There are some indications that the law, 
which requires nonbinding votes, has increased dialogue with shareholders 
without leading to routine second-guessing of executive pay packages.107 
Another example relates to the question of whether shareholders should 
have access to the company’s proxy statement so they can nominate their 
own director candidates to the board. In the wake of the D.C. Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                 
 103. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 104. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate 
Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 937-41 (2013).  
 105. See Michael D. Guttentag, On Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political 
Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593 (2014).  
 106. See Elizabeth Dexheimer, SEC’s White Attacked by Democrats over Political 
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 107. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a 
Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1249-
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decision to strike down federal rules relating to proxy access,108 the SEC 
enacted a rule that allows shareholders to propose that the company 
implement rules allowing for such access.109 To the extent that the right to 
sell is deficient in pressuring for change, opening up avenues for 
shareholders to express their preferences through the right to vote might be 
warranted.  
V. Conclusion 
More than fifty years later, Henry Manne’s work on the role of markets 
in regulating corporate governance continues to be influential. Manne offers 
a sensible response to the problem of the separation of ownership and 
control identified by Berle and Means. Rather than relying solely on law, 
investors rely on the discipline of the market to protect themselves from 
poor management. This argument has been utilized in a number of contexts 
to argue for less rather than more corporate governance regulation. 
The power of the right to sell has been a reason to maintain a system of 
regulatory federalism with respect to large public corporations. Limited 
mandatory rules through federal securities law protect trading investors, 
while the protection of the diverse interests of shareholder-owners is 
delegated to the enabling rules of the states, primarily Delaware. To some 
extent, investors should be expected to take care of themselves when they 
are unhappy with a company’s governance.  
This system has come under pressure in recent years, primarily because 
of the limits of the right to sell. The right to sell works best when 
shareholders are able to identify a clear problem and have time to express 
their displeasure with management by exiting the firm through selling. The 
sudden collapse of a number of prominent public companies and the 
persistence of governance problems (such as executive compensation) 
highlight the limits of the market’s ability to regulate the public 
corporation. Much of the federal corporate law enacted over the last fifteen 
years was motivated by the desire to remedy market failures. The process 
described by Manne and other law and economics scholars simply has not 
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been sufficient to protect shareholders from the effects of corporate 
mismanagement.  
When attempting to protect the ownership interest of investors, the 
concern is that regulation unduly favors one set of shareholders over others. 
Thus, regulators should be cautious in making federal corporate law. To the 
extent that certain governance problems raise national concerns, and benefit 
the vast majority of shareholders, some federal intervention is justified. The 
protection of investors through internal controls arguably meets these 
criteria.  
At the same time, not every governance issue should be the subject of 
federal concern. The lack of shareholder interest in pressuring managers 
over certain practices cannot be completely ignored when assessing 
corporate governance policy. At the very least, when the market views an 
issue as immaterial, there is likely shareholder disagreement as to whether 
intervention would be beneficial. When shareholders do not exercise the 
right to sell, it may mean that they view governance through a different lens 
than reformers who seek to change the prevailing practice. 
Ultimately, the case for mandatory corporate rules rests on the 
assumption that investors cannot protect themselves. History has shown that 
there are situations in which markets do not prevent corporate misconduct. 
The federal securities laws can be a source of protection when markets fail, 
but only when it is clear that intervention would be beneficial. 
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